Many of the problems at American educational institutions are the result, as Eric Cohen explains, of decades-long intellectual trends. But there are also more immediate causes, chief among them the influx of money from hostile Middle Eastern countries.

Today’s item in our ongoing series on Qatar’s malign influence looks more closely at how the country directs its funds to undermine America. The effects of petrodollars on Middle East-studies departments have been covered extensively; this report by the Philos Project looks at some areas that have received less attention but might be even more consequential. Take the Gulf emirate’s intimate relationship with Texas A&M University, which also has a campus in Doha:

The main Texas A&M campus has contracts related to the maintenance of American nuclear weapons. This could pose a security risk because, according to reports, there are unsecured communications and data systems between them and Texas A&M Qatar (TAMUQ). Additionally, Qatar openly leverages TAMUQ for its military development.

Given Qatar’s open relationship with Iran, the Iranian regime could infiltrate the campus systems or resources and extract information to benefit their military programs. In response to recent backlash, Texas A&M has promised to close the Doha campus by 2028, but that does not alter the intellectual-property agreements.

Nor are Qatari efforts limited to higher education:

Early in 2024, a public school in New York City displayed a Middle East map that had erased Israel and replaced it with “Palestine.” The map appeared as part of an “Arab Culture Arts” curriculum financed by Qatar Foundation International, a philanthropic group supported by the country’s ruling class. From 2019 to 2022, the organization donated over $1 million to the New York City Department of Education, nearly doubling its contributions in 2022.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.