In the UK, the Muslim Vote Comes into Its Own

Aug. 22 2024

When Keir Starmer assumed the British premiership on July 5, it was with the promise of restoring a more moderate Labor party after the era during which it was led by the anti-Israel radical Jeremy Corbyn. And while there is in fact much less anti-Semitism coming out of the mouths of Labor MPs these days, Stephen Pollard is so far not impressed with Starmer’s moderation. His foreign secretary, David Lammy, has already decided to restore funding to UNRWA (the organization for the support of the descendants of Palestinian refugees) despite the participation of its members in the October 7 attacks; he has also banned some arm sales to Israel. Pollard writes:

Britain is now only a theoretical ally of Israel. In practical terms, it is doing the bidding of those driven by hostility to the Jewish state. As I write in late July, the UK has just abandoned the previous government’s legal attempts (in coordination with Germany) to block the International Criminal Court’s arrest-warrant proceedings against Benjamin Netanyahu. The British government is now in effect endorsing the court’s decision to pursue the Israeli prime minister for war crimes in Gaza.

Such moves, Pollard observes, won’t really have much direct effect on Israel. Rather, he argues, they are “designed to appease domestic voters who are driven by an obsession with hatred of Israel.” And those voters have become a more significant, and better organized, constituency than ever:

With 4 million Muslims in England and Wales (6.5 percent of the population), the Muslim vote has always mattered in Britain. But until now it has never acted as a bloc or split away from the mainstream to support candidates who use intentionally divisive campaigns to appeal almost entirely—and only—to Muslims. For the first time in Britain (other than in the unique circumstances of Northern Ireland), sectarian voting became a significant driver of electoral fortunes in July, with four Muslim independent candidates who ran on a so-called pro-Gaza ticket winning, and a fifth, the former Labor leader Jeremy Corbyn (who was expelled from the party), who had a similar platform.

Labor lost these four seats to Muslim independents and came very close to losing many more—the near-losers included Wes Streeting and Shabana Mahmood, who are both now Cabinet ministers. In an election that saw Labor win one of its biggest-ever majorities, its overall vote total actually fell by more than 14 percent in those constituencies with a Muslim population of more than 15 percent.

To hold on to those districts, Labor will have to try to win back the defectors. And it’s easy to see how:

A poll before the election for the Henry Jackson Society showed that one in four British Muslims cited the Israel/Palestine conflict as their most important election issue, compared with just 3 percent of the public. Almost half said that Jews have too much power over UK government policy. The 2024 election showed how these attitudes are moving into the political mainstream with the rise of a newly cohesive Muslim bloc vote.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Anti-Semitism, European Islam, Labor Party (UK), United Kingdom

What Iran Seeks to Get from Cease-Fire Negotiations

June 20 2025

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy