On July 23, representatives of Fatah (the political party that governs the West Bank) and representatives of Hamas concluded a three-day summit in Beijing by signing an interim national-unity agreement. Eight days later, Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in Tehran. Khaled Abu Toameh examines what his death implies for Palestinian politics:

Public opinion polls conducted by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research over the past decade have consistently shown that Haniyeh is the only Hamas leader who could defeat [the current Fatah leader Mahmoud] Abbas in a Palestinian presidential election.

At times, it seemed that Abbas and other Fatah leaders were on good terms with Haniyeh. Despite the Fatah-Hamas rivalry, Abbas and Haniyeh did not hesitate to meet or talk over the phone to discuss various issues, particularly ways of “reconciling” their rival parties. . . . Shortly after Haniyeh’s death, Abbas and Fatah issued separate statements in which they strongly condemned the killing as a “cowardly act” and “a dangerous development.” Such statements, however, are viewed by many Palestinians as mere lip service directed towards the Palestinian public.

The death of Haniyeh, on the other hand, is likely to hinder efforts to achieve “national unity” between Fatah and Hamas. Haniyeh was one of the few Hamas leaders who fully supported mediation efforts . . . to end the Fatah-Hamas dispute.

As for Hamas itself, Khaled Meshal, who was head of the terrorist group’s politburo prior to Haniyeh, was favored to resume the position. But Yahya Sinwar, the organization’s leader within Gaza, has reportedly tried to prevent his return. Yoni Ben Menachem writes:

Iran opposes Khaled Meshal’s election as the temporary successor and is expected to attempt to thwart his appointment. Meshal opposes the military and political alliance between Hamas and Shiite Iran, favoring stronger ties with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Should Israel succeed in eliminating Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, Meshal’s chances of securing the position could increase.

Yesterday, the beepers used by hundreds of Hizballah operatives were detonated. Noah Rothman puts this ingenious attack in the context of the overall war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group:

[W]hile the disabling of an untold number of Hizballah operatives is remarkable, it’s also ominous. This week, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant told reporters that the hour is nearing when Israeli forces will have to confront Iran’s cat’s-paw in southern Lebanon directly, in order to return the tens of thousands of Israelis who fled their homes along Lebanon’s border under fire and have not yet been able to return. Today’s operation may be a prelude to the next phase of Israel’s defensive war, a dangerous one in which the IDF will face off against an enemy with tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 rockets and missiles trained on Israeli cities.

Seth Frantzman, meanwhile, focuses on the specific damage the pager bombings have likely done to Hizballah:

This will put the men in hospital for a period of time. Some of them can go back to serving Hizballah, but they will not have access to one of their hands. These will most likely be their dominant hand, meaning the hand they’d also use to hold the trigger of a rifle or push the button to launch a missile.

Hizballah has already lost around 450 fighters in its eleven-month confrontation with Israel. This is a significant loss for the group. While Hizballah can replace losses, it doesn’t have an endlessly deep [supply of recruits]. This is not only because it has to invest in training and security ahead of recruitment, but also because it draws its recruits from a narrow spectrum of Lebanese society.

The overall challenge for Hizballah is not just replacing wounded and dead fighters. The group will be challenged to . . . roll out some other way to communicate with its men. The use of pagers may seem archaic, but Hizballah apparently chose to use this system because it assumed the network could not be penetrated. . . . It will also now be concerned about the penetration of its operational security. When groups like Hizballah are in chaos, they are more vulnerable to making mistakes.