On July 23, representatives of Fatah (the political party that governs the West Bank) and representatives of Hamas concluded a three-day summit in Beijing by signing an interim national-unity agreement. Eight days later, Hamas’s political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in Tehran. Khaled Abu Toameh examines what his death implies for Palestinian politics:

Public opinion polls conducted by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research over the past decade have consistently shown that Haniyeh is the only Hamas leader who could defeat [the current Fatah leader Mahmoud] Abbas in a Palestinian presidential election.

At times, it seemed that Abbas and other Fatah leaders were on good terms with Haniyeh. Despite the Fatah-Hamas rivalry, Abbas and Haniyeh did not hesitate to meet or talk over the phone to discuss various issues, particularly ways of “reconciling” their rival parties. . . . Shortly after Haniyeh’s death, Abbas and Fatah issued separate statements in which they strongly condemned the killing as a “cowardly act” and “a dangerous development.” Such statements, however, are viewed by many Palestinians as mere lip service directed towards the Palestinian public.

The death of Haniyeh, on the other hand, is likely to hinder efforts to achieve “national unity” between Fatah and Hamas. Haniyeh was one of the few Hamas leaders who fully supported mediation efforts . . . to end the Fatah-Hamas dispute.

As for Hamas itself, Khaled Meshal, who was head of the terrorist group’s politburo prior to Haniyeh, was favored to resume the position. But Yahya Sinwar, the organization’s leader within Gaza, has reportedly tried to prevent his return. Yoni Ben Menachem writes:

Iran opposes Khaled Meshal’s election as the temporary successor and is expected to attempt to thwart his appointment. Meshal opposes the military and political alliance between Hamas and Shiite Iran, favoring stronger ties with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood axis led by Qatar, Turkey, and Pakistan.

Should Israel succeed in eliminating Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, Meshal’s chances of securing the position could increase.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.