After last spring’s sickening displays on college campuses, and the resultant congressional hearings, this school year many universities are seeking to do more to protect Jewish students, or at least to appear to do more. Northwestern University saw some especially ugly student protests, which included a poster depicting the school president Michael Schill with horns and with his face dripping blood. But Northwestern’s newest policies, writes Tal Fortgang, are unlikely to make much of a difference, although they are likely to serve as a model for other schools:

Schill announced that Northwestern would provide “expanded resources” and “educational opportunities” to combat “anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and other forms of hate.” At the heart of the plan: “Mandatory trainings on anti-Semitism and other forms of hate will be used in September at incoming student orientation and over the fall quarter for all returning students.”

Even leaving aside Northwestern’s inability to admit that it has a specific and ongoing problem with Jew hatred, the plan demonstrates that the school, like so many others, fundamentally misunderstands or refuses to confront the particular brand of anti-Semitism now infecting elite institutions. Consider the students or faculty responsible for caricaturing Schill as a bloodthirsty demon. They may or may not have known that they were invoking anti-Semitic tropes. But their motives were ideological: they believed no one, in good faith, could support what they believe is a “settler-colonialist” and “genocidal” Zionist entity.

To the vandals, no good-faith disagreements could be had about the history of the region and competing claims to the land. Rather, they believed that Schill is an apologist for colonialism and genocide, who sides with the oppressors out of sheer venality.

The best way for colleges to deal with their anti-Semitism problem—aside from having a zero-tolerance policy for students who engage in organized rule-breaking—is to stop teaching that all conflict should be viewed through the lens of oppression analysis.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.