Clifford May looks at Iran’s role in the growth of violent Islamism and at the consequences of America’s failure to sustain the fight against jihadists:

In 2011, President Barack Obama withdrew all U.S. military forces from Iraq, leading to the rise of the Islamic State group . . . and further opening Iraq to Iran’s influence. In 2021, President Biden withdrew all U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. That proved that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, planner of the 9/11 attacks, was correct when he told his CIA interrogators that jihadists can be confident of victory because “we only need to fight long enough for you to defeat yourself by quitting.”

For many years, Americans hoped that Russia and China would side with us in the Global War on Terrorism. . . . Xi Jinping, China’s Communist ruler, and Vladimir Putin, Russia’s neo-imperialist dictator, had agreed to a “no-limits” partnership in February 2022, just days before Russian troops invaded Ukraine. Both went on to establish close relations with Ali Khamenei, the Islamist “supreme leader” of Iran.

Mr. Khamenei has begun sending ballistic missiles to Russia. There are numerous other examples of military cooperation among the members of [this] axis of aggressors. North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela are also members. Are Americans capable of understanding that, 23 years after the 9/11 attacks, we’re in an even more dangerous era—no time for peace dividends and holidays from history?

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.