Equally interesting are the results of a recent survey of American Jewish opinion in Pennsylvania and in the swing districts of New York state. Even more noteworthy than their political opinions were respondents’ answers to questions about their religion. Maury Litwack and Bradley Honan write:

The results: Jewish voters are highly politically engaged and ready to cast what could be decisive ballots on election day. However, we also uncovered a noteworthy trend: Jewish people are reluctant to say they are Jewish.

Just as pollsters in recent elections have identified “shy” Trump voters, we are today picking up “shy” Jewish voters—those who are willing to participate in our polling calls, but who refuse to self-identify as Jewish to a stranger on the phone. Only when we altered the poll’s introduction to specify that we were polling the broader Jewish community about issues they are facing could we get many more Jewish voters—800 for the purposes of our survey—to pronounce their Judaism.

Overcoming that hurdle, we found that 56 percent of Pennsylvania Jewish voters and 66 percent of those in the New York districts say the events of October 7 have made them much more likely to vote in November. The rise of anti-Semitism, too, is increasing Jewish voter engagement: 67 percent of those polled in both Pennsylvania and New York say that factor makes them more likely to vote this fall.

While Jewish voters are a relatively small group nationally, they are very politically engaged, and are particularly influential in key states and districts that could well decide who controls the White House and Congress. . . . Candidates taking the Jewish vote for granted may well go down to defeat.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.