Yesterday, reports emerged that Hizballah had appointed Hashem Safieddine, a relative of his late predecessor Hassan Nasrallah, as its new secretary general, though the Iran-backed terror group subsequently denied this. Hanin Ghaddar analyzes what Israel’s elimination of Nasrallah portends for the organization.

[R]eplacing the charismatic longtime leader will be very difficult. He has become inseparable from the group’s brand, and is identified with successes such as Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the perceived summer 2006 “divine victory” against Israel. Nasrallah served as a father figure for many Lebanese Shiites, who regarded him as their provider and protector. Whoever succeeds him will not have an enviable job, given the eviscerated condition of the group and the likely dark days ahead. Yet the resulting void will provide opportunities for the international community to advocate better leadership for Lebanese Shiites and the entire nation.

Since October 2023, when Hizballah committed to support Hamas’s fight against Israel, its trio of first-tier commanders, Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, and Ali Karaki, along with most of its second-tier commanders, have been killed. Given this loss of personnel along with the infrastructural blows and associated weakening of trust, it will be an arduous yearslong task to rebuild the group’s military prowess.

Moreover, Nasrallah himself served a principal role in restructuring Hizballah military activities and coordinating with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Thus, the connective tissue between Lebanon and Iran has now been cut.

How did Qatar, an American ally, become the nerve center of the leading Palestinian jihadist organization? Natalie Ecanow explains.

When Jordan expelled Hamas in 1999, Qatar offered sanctuary to the group, which had already become notorious for using suicide-bombing attacks over the previous decade. . . . Hamas chose to relocate to Syria. However, that arrangement lasted for only a decade. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the terror group found its way back to Qatar.

In 2003, Hamas leaders reportedly convened in Qatar after the IDF attempted to eliminate Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, following a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed seven people, including two American citizens. This episode led to one of the first efforts by Qatar to advocate for its terror proxy.

Thirteen years and five wars between Hamas and Israel later, Qatar’s support for Hamas has not waned. . . . To this day, Qatari officials maintain that the office came at the “request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas.” However, an Obama White House official asserted that there was never any request from Washington. . . . Inexplicably, the United States government continues to rely on Qatar to negotiate for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, even as the regime hosts the terror group’s political elite.

A reckoning is needed between our two countries. Congressional hearings, legislation, executive orders, and other measures to regulate relations between our countries are long overdue.