How Iran and Russia Threaten the U.S. in Africa

Oct. 31 2024

Tuesday’s newsletter addressed growing Russian support for the Houthis in Yemen, which is only one part of the Kremlin’s ever more unambiguous support for Iran and its proxies in their war against Israel. Just across the Red Sea, Moscow’s influence stretches into Africa, where it has recently had success in supplanting American influence. Zineb Riboua explains how the Wagner mercenary group—in reality an extension of the Russian government—has been making inroads, and what can be done about it:

Despite their successes, Wagner mercenaries have struggled to produce meaningful, positive outcomes on the ground. Their efforts to counter terrorist threats—central to their mission and legitimacy—have been notably ineffective. Since the Russian-backed military juntas outsourced security to Wagner, terrorist threats have only increased. . . . The arrival of Wagner mercenaries has also fueled the rise of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and Jamaa’t Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) while also reigniting militant separatist movements. . . .

[T]he United States should promote enhanced cooperation among NATO’s southern members, non-major NATO allies, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

As Riboua points out, Russia has found a foothold in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, in part because it switched sides in Sudan’s bloody civil war. That decision puts it on the same side as Iran, another country that has increasing influence in the same areas of Africa, as Efraim Inbar explains:

In African countries, Iran is exploiting weak institutions and porous borders to establish a Hizballah foothold. While Hizballah’s primary focus remains the Middle East, its financial and logistical networks in Africa are part of a broader strategy of gaining global influence. Hizballah is involved in narcotraffic and terrorism. If conflict with Israel or the U.S. intensifies, Tehran could leverage the assets acquired to strike Western interests in Africa, expanding the scope of Middle Eastern hostilities.

Indeed, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), particularly its elite Quds Force, plays a central role in Iran’s expansionist in Sudan, along the Red Sea. This partnership is of consequence in Sudan. Recently, the IRGC has forged close ties with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s military. . . . In exchange for military support, such as drones and advanced weaponry, Iran is reportedly seeking to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. If successful, this base would give Iran and Hizballah a new platform from which to launch attacks against Israeli and Western targets in the region.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Africa, Al Qaeda, Iran, Russia, Sudan, U.S. Foreign policy

After Taking Steps toward Reconciliation, Turkey Has Again Turned on Israel

“The Israeli government, blinded by Zionist delusions, seizes not only the UN Security Council but all structures whose mission is to protect peace, human rights, freedom of the press, and democracy,” declared the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a speech on Wednesday. Such over-the-top anti-Israel rhetoric has become par for the course from the Turkish head of state since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year, after which relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have been in what Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak describes as “free fall.”

While Erdogan has always treated Israel with a measure of hostility, the past few years had seen steps to reconciliation. Yanarocak explains this sharp change of direction, which is about much more than the situation in Gaza:

The losses at the March 31, 2024 Turkish municipal elections were an unbearable blow for Erdoğan. . . . In retrospect it appears that Erdoğan’s previous willingness to continue trade relations with Israel pushed some of his once-loyal supporters toward other Islamist political parties, such as the New Welfare Party. To counter this trend, Erdoğan halted trade relations, aiming to neutralize one of the key political tools available to his Islamist rivals.

Unsurprisingly, this decision had a negative impact on Turkish [companies] engaged in trade with Israel. To maintain their long-standing trade relationships, these companies found alternative ways to conduct business through intermediary Mediterranean ports.

The government in Ankara also appears to be concerned about the changing balance of power in the region. The weakening of Iran and Hizballah could create an unfavorable situation for the Assad regime in Syria, [empowering Turkish separatists there]. While Ankara is not fond of the mullahs, its core concern remains Iran’s territorial integrity. From Turkey’s perspective, the disintegration of Iran could set a dangerous precedent for secessionists within its own borders.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Iran, Israel diplomacy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey