Tuesday’s newsletter addressed growing Russian support for the Houthis in Yemen, which is only one part of the Kremlin’s ever more unambiguous support for Iran and its proxies in their war against Israel. Just across the Red Sea, Moscow’s influence stretches into Africa, where it has recently had success in supplanting American influence. Zineb Riboua explains how the Wagner mercenary group—in reality an extension of the Russian government—has been making inroads, and what can be done about it:

Despite their successes, Wagner mercenaries have struggled to produce meaningful, positive outcomes on the ground. Their efforts to counter terrorist threats—central to their mission and legitimacy—have been notably ineffective. Since the Russian-backed military juntas outsourced security to Wagner, terrorist threats have only increased. . . . The arrival of Wagner mercenaries has also fueled the rise of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and Jamaa’t Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) while also reigniting militant separatist movements. . . .

[T]he United States should promote enhanced cooperation among NATO’s southern members, non-major NATO allies, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

As Riboua points out, Russia has found a foothold in Port Sudan on the Red Sea, in part because it switched sides in Sudan’s bloody civil war. That decision puts it on the same side as Iran, another country that has increasing influence in the same areas of Africa, as Efraim Inbar explains:

In African countries, Iran is exploiting weak institutions and porous borders to establish a Hizballah foothold. While Hizballah’s primary focus remains the Middle East, its financial and logistical networks in Africa are part of a broader strategy of gaining global influence. Hizballah is involved in narcotraffic and terrorism. If conflict with Israel or the U.S. intensifies, Tehran could leverage the assets acquired to strike Western interests in Africa, expanding the scope of Middle Eastern hostilities.

Indeed, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), particularly its elite Quds Force, plays a central role in Iran’s expansionist in Sudan, along the Red Sea. This partnership is of consequence in Sudan. Recently, the IRGC has forged close ties with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of Sudan’s military. . . . In exchange for military support, such as drones and advanced weaponry, Iran is reportedly seeking to establish a naval base in Port Sudan. If successful, this base would give Iran and Hizballah a new platform from which to launch attacks against Israeli and Western targets in the region.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.