Using its spy satellites, U.S. intelligence obtained information about Israel’s planned counterattack on Iran that some official then leaked, and which subsequently appeared in Iranian state media. The IDF has likely delayed its strike to come up with an alternative plan as a result. More recent reports about who was responsible for the leak remain unconfirmed, but, argue the editors of National Review, something is definitely amiss within the current national-security apparatus:

[N]o individual who has had extensive contact with Iranian intelligence and diplomatic officials, and who has deferred to the direction of those officials before, should have ever been put in a sensitive position in the first place. The Biden administration has ignored this rather simple rule.

The most glaring example of its questionable handling of the Iran portfolio is [the] Iran envoy Robert Malley’s continued employment by the State Department amid a probe into his handling of classified materials and the possibility that he shared information with the regime. . . . Possibly worse than Malley’s appointment is that of Ariane Tabatabai, an academic turned State Department and Pentagon official. She was part of the now-infamous Iran Experts Initiative—a program used by Tehran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cultivate relationships with foreign academics who could carry water for the regime.

[S]ince October 7, pro-Hamas ideologues within the State Department have labored to leak information that would help their cause and damage Israel’s war effort. . . . The president was wrong to appoint these officials in the first place, and he should have fired them long ago.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.