One sometimes overlooked theater of this war is Iraq, where Iran-backed militias have been launching drones at Israel—one of which killed two soldiers in October. On Monday, Israel formally requested that the UN Security Council pressure Baghdad to rein in these militias. But ultimately, only the U.S. can make that happen. And American influence depends on whether Donald Trump will carry out President Biden’s plans to shut down U.S. military bases in Iraq. Eric Navarro warns of the dangerous consequences of doing so:

Critics may condemn the American presence in Iraq as original sin. . . . The United States does not have the luxury, however, to fumble the present because it disagrees with the past. . . . The fact that the United States has forces stationed in Iraq at low cost and with few casualties should matter. The new administration must ask what the United States would gain from withdrawal.

By maintaining a presence at key nodes such as the Al Asad air base, the United States can avoid creating a vacuum that China, Russia, or Iran would fill. A presence also provides an ability to accomplish strategic and operational outcomes that further U.S. national interests. . . . This, in turn, can help deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, thwart Turkey’s aggressiveness toward the Kurds, aid Israel in its defense against Iran and its proxies, and strengthen the existing alliances with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

The question is not whether Trump will bring home American troops; it is whether he will empower Iran and China at America’s expense.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.