On Monday, a crowd of anti-Israel demonstrators gathered in front of a Toronto-area synagogue for hours—violating a new regulation banning protests within 100 meters of houses of worship. Police were present in force but did nothing to enforce the law. Such occurrences have become almost unremarkable in Canada in the past fourteen months. As one Canadian Jew, who has lived in the country for 73 years, told Terry Glavin, “it was like a dam burst.” Glavin investigates the situation and finds it even it worse than it might seem:

Americans are familiar with the pattern that has been repeated at dozens of Canadian university and college campuses—the “pro-Palestinian” occupations, encampments, manifestos, disturbances, and explicit celebrations of the October 7 “resistance.” In Canada, however, the sociopathology . . . is by no means confined to the extremes of campus politics or the rantings of far-left activist groups.

Rather than discovering how torn the fabric of their society has become, Canadian Jews are being forced to come to terms with just how deeply anti-Semitism has been woven into it. This is not a matter of anecdote or impression.

[The] verbal or physical assaults . . . are being carried out by self-described progressives, Arabs, and, often, recent immigrants who are operating inside an ideological framework of “settler colonialism,” which casts Canada, the United States, Australia, and, most of all, Israel, as irredeemably illegitimate constructs of imperialism, capitalism, genocide, and racism. . . . In Liberal circles, a new ideological construction is gaining ground—one that threatens to destroy all that it touches in much the way Critical Race Theory has done. That new idea is “Anti-Palestinian Racism,” defined in such a way as to place Zionism—that is, the view held by the vast majority of Jews—beyond the pale of polite society, and potentially beyond the bounds of Canadian hate-speech law.

While contributing to the environment that fosters anti-Semitism, the government does almost nothing to defend Canadian Jews, which might explain the feebleness of the response to Monday’s protest:

In August this year, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police said the disturbances have placed an unsustainable strain on police services across the country—and matters are made worse by the absence of “moral and financial support” from all levels of government.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.