While the implications of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s victory for the West remain to be seen, they are unambiguously bad for Russia. The Kremlin has invested considerable resources in propping up Bashar al-Assad, and Syria’s Latakia port and various airbases were its most important overseas military assets. Zineb Riboua explains the far-reaching consequences:

Putin . . . failed to anticipate the repercussions of Israel’s operations against Iranian targets. Given Russia’s reliance on Iran to sustain its activities in Syria after over a decade of collaboration and coordination to sustain the Assad regime, this oversight has significantly undercut Moscow’s strategic posture in the region.

Though Tehran serves as a pragmatic partner in countering U.S. influence, destabilizing U.S. allies, and pressuring states not to normalize relations with Israel, it is an inherently weak regime. Indeed, Israel has demonstrated exceptional resolve, capability, and consistency in targeting Iran’s proxies, particularly Hizballah. Russia has depended heavily on Iran’s proxies, such as Hizballah, to continue its operations. By systematically assaulting these proxies, Israel indirectly exposed the fragility of Putin’s dependence on Tehran.

Russia’s years-long effort to position itself as an alternative security guarantor has unraveled in just a matter of days. Viral videos showing anti-Assad rebels swiftly capturing cities, villages, and military bases have shattered Moscow’s carefully cultivated image. Putin can no longer tout his role in “saving” Assad from the Syrian Civil War—a narrative he has often used to bolster Russia’s influence abroad. Once a key asset in Russia’s efforts to woo military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, Russia’s image as a protector of global authoritarians has lost much of its credibility.

In a recent episode of 60 Minutes, a former State Department official tells the interviewer that U.S. support for Israel following October 7 has “put a target on America’s back” in the Arab world “and beyond the Arab world.” The complaint is a familiar one: Middle Easterners hate the United States because of its closeness to the Jewish state. But this gets things exactly backward. Just look at the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its various Arab proxies: America is the “Great Satan” and Israel is but the “Little Satan.”

Why, then, does Iran see the U.S. as the world’s primary source of evil? The usual answer invokes the shah’s 1953 ouster of his prime minister, but the truth is that this wasn’t the subversion of democracy it’s usually made out to be, and the CIA’s role has been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, Ladan Boroumand points out,

the 1953 coup was welcomed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, [the architect of the 1979 Islamic Revolution], and would not have succeeded without the active complicity of proponents of political Islam. And . . . the United States not only refrained from opposing the Islamic Revolution but inadvertently supported its emergence and empowered its agents. How then could . . . Ayatollah Khomeini’s virulent enmity toward the United States be explained or excused?

Khomeini’s animosity toward the shah and the United States traces back to 1963–64, when the shah initiated sweeping social reforms that included granting women the right to vote and to run for office and extending religious minorities’ political rights. These reforms prompted the pro-shah cleric of 1953 to become his vocal critic. It wasn’t the shah’s autocratic rule that incited Khomeini’s opposition, but rather the liberal nature of his autocratically implemented social reforms.

There is no need for particular interpretive skill to comprehend the substance of Khomeini’s message: as Satan, America embodies the temptation that seduces Iranian citizens into sin and falsehood. “Human rights” and “democracy” are America’s tools for luring sinful and deviant citizens into conspiring against the government of God established by the ayatollah.

Or, as George W. Bush put it, jihadists hate America because “they hate our freedoms.”