On Saturday night, Israel shot down yet another ballistic missile from Yemen, this one reportedly aimed at a major power plant near Hadera on the northern coast. The Iran-backed Houthi rebels also continue to attack international shipping, and are likely granting safe passage to Chinese vessels in exchange for arms. Meanwhile, General Erik Kurilla, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East, has for months been warning that the current approach won’t succeed. Elliott Abrams writes:

Kurilla told the Senate Armed Services Committee last March that there was no way to degrade the Houthis’ arsenal if Iran could simply rebuild it. . . . The Biden administration has, in recent weeks, stepped up attacks on the Houthis—but has done nothing to penalize their supplier.

The right path forward for the new Trump administration is not to give in to Iranian and Houthi attacks by removing our troops from Iraq and Syria, nor by removing the U.S. Navy from international waters in the Middle East—the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb. It is to repeat the Trump method of 2020: let Iran clearly know that if an American is killed or wounded, or a Navy ship hit, by a Houthi weapon supplied by Iran, the United States will respond directly against Iran.

As General Kurilla said, we should be seeking to interdict the supply of such weapons, but that is not enough; that effort will never be 100-percent effective. A better way forward is deterring Iran from supplying the Houthis by making Iran pay for any damage done.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.