As America takes steps to try to mediate the Russia-Ukraine war, Kyiv has an opportunity to show its usefulness to the U.S. (and to Israel) in the Middle East, both by combating Russian influence and assisting in containing Iran. Anna Borshchevskaya writes:

Until recently, Russia was the largest supplier of wheat to Syria—grain largely stolen from Ukraine. However, with the fall of Assad’s regime, these shipments have been suspended, creating an ideal opening for Kyiv. Wheat could serve as a starting point for expanded trade, alongside the development of diplomatic, cultural, and potentially military ties between the two nations; a strengthened Ukrainian presence there could limit Russia’s options beyond its military bases, should it manage to retain them.

Ukraine can [also] share its experience with Iran as part of its increased engagement with the Middle East, assisting Arab partners (and Israel) in countering Iranian influence. After Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine and Iran’s supply of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, Ukraine has gained valuable insights into dealing with Iran. These lessons could benefit audiences in the region.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.