On Saturday and Sunday, Israel carried out airstrikes in the Beqaa Valley and other locations in Lebanon north of the Litani River. The strikes targeted Hizballah operatives, a weapons factory, and a tunnel for smuggling arms from Syria. With such moves, the IDF hopes to stymie the Iran-backed terrorist group’s attempts to rebuild its military capacity and prepare for another war. But ultimately, only the Lebanese government can prevent the jihadists from reasserting their de-facto control of the country. Hanin Ghaddar writes:

[A]lthough Hizballah is down, it is not out. The group and its allies currently control 53 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member parliament, enough to sway important decisions. If they can work with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering bloc and the former prime minister Saad Hariri’s National Moderation party, they will have a majority of seats. The group can physically attack or threaten representatives who do not follow their wishes, as well as other domestic actors who stand in their way. No one should be surprised if Hizballah resorts to such intimidation.

While Hizballah still has the ability to make good on threats to its rivals, Ghaddar writes, “its morale has tanked,” and its base is shaken:

Shiite support for Hizballah may already be waning. Hizballah’s social contract with the community—the former provides the latter with security, political empowerment, and services and the latter provides the former with recruits and votes—has been on shaky ground for over a decade. The cracks first emerged in 2011, when Hizballah began spending heavily to help Assad win the Syrian Civil War rather than to help its constituents.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.