After stints as a stand-up comedian, martial artist, and game-show host, Joe Rogan tried his hand at podcasting, and since 2015 has been one of the most successful figures in the genre. Rogan recently interviewed two anti-Semites who made a name for themselves in the same world of social media, podcasting, and online videos—thus massively expanding their reach and, in the eyes of many, their legitimacy. Then, just last week, he invited the journalist Douglas Murray onto his show to discuss the wars in Ukraine and Israel, alongside the comedian-turned-anti-Israel-propagandist Dave Smith.

Douglas Murray recounts his sojourn into the fever swamps:

Claiming some Jewish ancestry, [Smith] has spent the eighteen months since October 7, 2023, being very unfunny indeed. Specifically, he has decided to spend his time going around the podcast world sounding off about Israel. In the process, he largely cites people like him—people who have many views but no obvious expertise.

People like [the Hitler apologist] Darryl Cooper, who says he isn’t a historian yet has been invited onto some of the world’s biggest podcasts as “a historian.” One of Cooper’s many ahistorical claims is that Winston Churchill was the chief villain of World War II. . . . When invited to debate the world’s foremost living expert on Churchill last year, he declined, saying that he didn’t know enough to go against such a figure.

Yet still Cooper gets invited on show after show to throw out falsehoods that he can’t even back up. And on which his online interviewers seem happy not to challenge him. Two weeks ago, Rogan had his mate Dave Smith on yet again for a long podcast.

But for my return to the show, the deal was that I could come on only if Dave Smith was—once again—in the studio. As if Joe didn’t want to be unaccompanied. Or that Joe thought it was I—of all his guests—who must be challenged.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.