As Tevi Troy discussed in last week’s podcast, the divisions within the Trump administration over relations with Israel are typical of Republican presidencies, and reflect more general divergences about America’s role in the world. Michael Doran, looking closely at the current intramural feuds, detects a split between “Restraintists” and hawks, and notes that Restraintism has a long pedigree both on the right and, perhaps especially, on the left. Indeed, it was the overwhelming impulse of the Obama administration, made especially manifest in its Iran policy. But now Restraintism comes in new clothes:

In its harsher expressions, it offers cover for darker impulses. It has become a favored mask for those who rail against shadowy elites and, at times, unmistakably, “the Jews.” According to the hardcore Restraintists, the mainstream press remains captive to “the neocons,” shorthand for entrenched elites who, often Jewish, champion strong U.S. support for Israel to promote [supposedly] senseless global engagement. With an air of certainty and intellectual superiority, Restraintists advance pseudo-solutions to complex problems.

So why has Trump stacked his administration with Restraintists—people who sometimes have loony ideas that he doesn’t follow? The answer is simple: he no longer trusts the traditional Republican foreign-policy establishment. . . . Whoever is on record as opposing “the neocons” is therefore in line for a promotion from the margins to the power centers of D.C.

So which side will dominate? Doran makes two points:

Americans may reject large-scale military deployments in the Middle East, but they understand that leaving the Middle East altogether and thereby handing control of the global energy markets to China is lunacy. They still support Israel, distrust Iran, and don’t believe the United States can stand by while Tehran builds nuclear weapons—positions that Trump also holds.

Unlike the commonly assumed chaos of Trump’s decision-making, this oscillation between conflicting approaches serves a coherent strategy: it creates uncertainty for adversaries and flexibility for the United States and gives Trump multiple pathways to advance American interests.

Let’s hope he is right on both counts. There is much more to Doran’s argument, including prescriptions for how President Trump should approach the Middle East:

First, he must finish the job against Iran and dismantle its nuclear program, along with the missile and drone infrastructure that threatens its neighbors and supplies its proxy network. . . . Second, and perhaps more crucially for long-term regional stability, Trump must broker a modus vivendi between Israel and Turkey in Syria. This may be even harder than cutting Iran down to size.

Here there is some reason for optimism, given recent reports that the two countries are trying to establish a deconfliction mechanism for their operations in Syria. But success requires American diplomatic intervention—and American might.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.