Earlier this month, Emanuel Macron announced that France is preparing to recognize a Palestinian state, perhaps as early as June. He claimed that doing so would “allow all those who defend Palestine to recognize Israel in turn.” It appears that France will be working in concert with Spain, Ireland, and Norway. To Aviram Bellaishe, Macron and other European leaders are hoping to mollify their own restive Muslim populations with such moves. Besides detailing the many problems with this policy, Bellaishe outlines what European governments could do that would actually foster Palestinian self-government and make peace more feasible:

The current situation provides no basis for a sovereign state, and any hasty recognition will only exacerbate the chaos. Instead, Europe—purportedly the party that will lead the effort—must, in cooperation with the United States and the moderate Arab states, create the conditions on the ground for the gradual building of state infrastructure.

The lesson from Lebanon is clear: a state cannot rise as long as armed terror organizations operate alongside it. Therefore, a fundamental requirement is the total disarmament of all the Palestinian organizations—both in Gaza and the West Bank.

Another requirement concerns people. For two decades, it has been impossible for a new Palestinian leadership to grow. A whole generation of professionals, academics, entrepreneurs, and educators has been excluded from the political framework. An ossified government and a corrupt structure have blocked any dynamic of renewal.

The true leadership, however, will not grow from the offices of the PA but from [this] civilian stratum. . . . Such a leadership will not deal initially with the conflict with Israel, but with the internal building of a civil society, a stable labor market, and education, media, and health services.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.