Israeli news outlets recently reported that Qatar, which has played a crucial role as a mediator in hostage negotiations since October 7, 2023, encouraged Hamas to reject the latest offer put forth by the Egyptians—in favor of digging in its heels and waiting for better terms. The revelation simply confirms what readers of this newsletter already know: that Doha sees itself not as a neutral party, and certainly not as a U.S. ally, but as a protector of Hamas’s interests. Yet Washington continues to treat the emirate as, in the words of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, “a reliable partner.” Jonathan Schanzer takes a closer look at this wealthy monarchy’s perfidy:

Qatar, as the U.S. intelligence community had long known, was a haven for future 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammed. He had wired money from Qatar to al-Qaeda operatives in advance of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Just as U.S. forces were on the verge of trapping him in a net in 1996, senior figures from the Qatari regime warned Mohammed and helped him escape.

In that same year, the Qatari regime created the Al Jazeera television network. The satellite station went on to become a vitriolic mouthpiece for al-Qaeda, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other jihadist factions Washington sought to counter after the 9/11 attacks. . . . And so it came to be that Qatar supported jihadist causes across the Middle East while simultaneously working with Washington at the highest levels.

Doha insists that the Hamas and Taliban offices were established at the behest of the American government, to engage with the two terrorist groups. While officials have since thanked Doha for its services, there is no record of the U.S. government ever requesting these offices to be established.

Besides funding Hamas to the tune of $30 million per month on the eve of the October 7 attacks, Qatar has also been dispensing its largesse inside America’s borders:

Estimates suggest that Qatar has gifted anywhere from $7 billion to $20 billion to institutions of higher learning over the past two decades. Alarmingly, researchers are now combing through data revealing that Qatar has invested untold sums in K–12 public schools as well. Indeed, the Islamist dictatorship that funds Hamas and the Taliban has a foothold in American education.

Law firms, lobby groups, public-relations shops, and other levers of influence are all on generous Qatari retainers. Hedge funds, mutual funds, joint ventures, and other generators of American wealth are similarly beholden to Qatari cash. Large parcels of real estate in one city after the next have been gobbled up by Qatari-backed developers. And that’s just what we know.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.