On April 11, the South Carolina congressman Joe Wilson announced a plan to introduce legislation designating the Polisario Front as a terrorist group, noting that it serves the interests of Russia and Iran. This guerrilla force is based in Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony of uncertain status, much of which is under Moroccan control. Amine Ayoub explains that Polisario increasingly resembles Iranian proxies in the Middle East, and fits into a larger project of destabilization in the region:

Let’s stop pretending the Polisario is a harmless separatist group. They’re not freedom fighters. They’re Iran-backed mercenaries operating from Algerian soil, funded by Tehran’s Quds Force, trained by Hizballah operatives, and increasingly useful to Moscow.

Credible intelligence—including U.S. and French reports—shows that Hizballah operatives have trained Polisario fighters in the Tindouf camps in Algeria. Iran’s fingerprints are all over this. Their goal? Bleed Morocco, destabilize North Africa, and open a new corridor for jihadist infiltration and Russian disinformation.

And the timing isn’t coincidental. As Morocco deepens ties with Israel and the U.S., the Iran-Hizballah axis sees the Western Sahara as the perfect place to retaliate. . . . And Algeria, increasingly aligned with Russia and China, has no problem letting Hizballah trainers operate on its soil—so long as the guns are pointed at Morocco.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.