While the Trump administration has frozen over $2 billion in federal aid to Harvard, and is now threatening to revoke the school’s tax-exempt status, Ruth R. Wisse is skeptical that much will change. Wisse, who taught at Harvard for over two decades, notes that on October 12, 2023, the campus chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine declared that it sees itself as “PART of this movement, not in solidarity with this movement”—the movement in question being Hamas. Wisse looks to the roots of the problem:

Harvard was a soft target for foreign penetration, having developed an adversarial relationship to the American government and increasingly to the country itself. . . . By the 1990s, black campus groups were hosting Afrocentric and Nation of Islam speakers who agitated against whites and Jews. In 1992 Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr., warned: “This is anti-Semitism from the top down, engineered and promoted by leaders who affect to be speaking for a larger resentment.” To this grievance coalition were added groups of Marxists, anticapitalists, anticolonialists, and anti-imperialists. The 2011 Occupy Wall Street encampments were allowed to close Harvard Yard for several months.

All these demonstrators lacked a common cause until they united around the handiest target in the history of civilization under the guise of liberating the Palestinians. Students who had been kept from marching for their country and warned against insulting every other minority jumped at the chance to attack a politically approved target.

In a letter to the Harvard community, President Alan Garber acknowledges valid concerns about rising anti-Semitism and pledges that Harvard will continue to fight “hate” with the urgency it demands and federal law requires. Harvard’s record provides ample evidence against this claim. Campus coalitions for jihad count on liberal administrators to accommodate their assault.

The most useful of many political functions of anti-Zionism—as with anti-Semitism before Jews returned to their homeland—is building coalitions of grievance and blame against a small nation with a universally inflated and mostly negative image. . . . Attacking only the Jews—now only Israel—is its key to becoming the world’s most powerful antidemocratic ideology.

The goal of destroying Israel remains central to Arab and Islamist identity and was admitted to Harvard along with some foreign students and investors. The Education Department reports the university received more than $100 million from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bangladesh between January 2020 and October 2024.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.