Wednesday saw another shameful display at Columbia University as an anti-Israel mob stormed the library while students were studying for finals, leaving graffiti on walls and furniture with such slogans as “Columbia will burn for the martyrs.” But if things have been bad at American centers of higher education, they may be even worse at Britain’s. Stephen Pollard offers an illustrative and troubling example:

At Queen Mary University in east London, some students decided to hold a silent vigil on October 7, 2024 to mark the anniversary of the Hamas massacre. The vigil, comprised of a small group of students, was soon surrounded by hundreds of fellow students with banners and megaphones, shouting “Globalize the student intifada” and other slogans.

There is, as you well know, nothing unusual about this. It is, appallingly, a scene routinely witnessed when Jewish students seek to remember the victims of October 7 (and, of course, it happens beyond campus, too). But this time the university’s security staff intervened. A rare but welcome event, you might think. Except their target was not the baying mob barracking the small gathering of Jews but rather the small gathering of Jews, who were removed to a safe room, as the students described in a StandWithUs report.

Nothing better sums up the state of anti-Semitism on campus. Not only is it allowed to run rampant, unchecked, and unstopped; it is actually supported, either by a failure to act, sending the clear message that it is permissible, or—as in the incident above—by removing the peaceful Jews rather than those harassing them.

The incident reminds me very much of the reaction to pogroms in tsarist Russia, where police would be sent in to quell the disorder, and immediately arrest the Jews, since it seemed impossible to them that anyone else could be the guilty party. And the current British government, Pollard goes on to explain, is no more likely than the Romanovs to take meaningful action.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.