The coming Israeli offensive might well mean the defeat of Hamas as a governing force and Israeli military occupation of more territory in Gaza. And that means addressing the question of what will become of the Strip after Hamas is gone. While most discussion of the subject focuses on who will govern and how, Ksenia Svetlova raises a much more important question: what to do with a large population that has been inculcated from an early age with hatred of Jews and admiration for jihad? She looks to the example of other Middle Eastern countries that have faced similar problems.

Three countries—Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—have distinctive long-term deradicalization strategies that combine security measures with religious, educational, and socioeconomic initiatives.

Following the 2003 Casablanca bombings, Morocco implemented a counterterrorism strategy combining aggressive security operations with socioeconomic development and religious-education oversight. Beyond active security measures, Morocco established the Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imams in 2015 to promote moderate interpretations of Islam based on the Maliki school of jurisprudence, reformed religious-education curricula, and created the Mosalaha (Reconciliation) program for rehabilitating extremist prisoners.

In Saudi Arabia, the Mohammed bin Naif Counseling and Care Center claims an 80-percent success rate in rehabilitating extremists. The Saudi approach separates extremist and non-extremist prisoners, provides extensive post-release incentives including marriage support and employment assistance, and emphasizes family involvement in the rehabilitation process.

Whatever approach is employed, Svetlova argues,

it must be supported and guided by regional powers with records in combatting radicalization. Arab countries with deradicalization experience, including Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, could play roles in such efforts.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”