Recently the White House floated a proposal to provide parents with $5,000 upon the birth of a child. Similar schemes have been tried by European countries hoping to counteract even more severely declining birthrates. Tim Carney explains the possible benefits:

Nearly every year since 2007, Americans have had fewer and fewer babies. The birthrate in the United States has fallen from about 2.1 babies per woman in 2007 to 1.6 in 2023. The working-age population will soon start shrinking, and schools all over America are consolidating and downsizing to adjust to this demographic decline.

Evidence suggests that the most effective way for a national government to boost birthrates is not through targeted measures such as universal daycare or mandated maternity leave, but by providing substantial cash payments to parents for each child they have.

Childbirth brings with it many one-time costs: hospital and doctor bills, a new crib and baby clothes, moving into a bigger apartment, or taking time off work. Also, new parents, being younger, tend to have lower incomes than older parents, so it makes sense to shift some family support closer to birth. [Moreover], a large check soon after birth, separate from tax returns, is more tangible for parents and can be more of an incentive.

Still, countries like Hungary and Singapore that have leaned into baby bonuses and similar policies have seen only limited effects. Carney explains why it seems “cost and affordability” are not the main reasons for declining birthrates, and therefore economic measures can only do so much:

First, consider that the birthrate was much higher in 2008—in the midst of the Great Recession—than it is today or was in 2019, when the economy was stellar. Second, the baby bust is concentrated among millennials and Generation Z, who are not poorer than Generation X or baby boomers were. Third, geographical variations in costs do not seem to predict geographical variations in birthrate.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.