I’ve often wondered if the endless debate over whether, and when, hatred of Israel (misleadingly called anti-Zionism) constitutes anti-Semitism is a trap that Jews have laid for themselves and then stepped into. After all, cheering on murderous terrorists in their quest to destroy a successful democratic state is indefensible even if not motivated by racial or religious prejudice. Jacob M. Miller, considering the conclusions of Harvard’s anti-Semitism task force, has come to a similar conclusion:

Take the Harvard Undergraduate Palestine Solidarity Committee’s infamous statement blaming Israel for the slaughter of its own people. Was the statement offensive? Surely. Did it reveal an astonishing misunderstanding of the conflict? I would say so. Did it fundamentally change how I see my classmates and make me seriously question their moral compasses? Most definitely.

But was it anti-Semitic? I suppose one could argue that it was—it did, after all, betray a disgraceful disregard for Jewish life. But to me that argument seems tenuous. Instead I content myself with calling the statement what it was: a stunningly shameful act for which, to my knowledge, no one in Harvard’s pro-Palestine coalition has apologized to this day.

There is a reason Harvard created twin task forces on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia—not a “Task Force on Callous Statements Disregarding Human Life,” or a “Task Force on Violent Protest Chants,” or a “Task Force on Stupid Political Ideologies That Could Open Up Millions of People to Religious Persecution.” It’s because we as a society have agreed identity-based discrimination is morally wrong, but have struggled to reach a consensus that any other way of thinking is unethical.

[O]ur national politics, which rightly protects identity groups from prejudice but hasn’t adequately articulated other moral wrongs, has created a twisted incentive structure—one in which Jews on campus feel compelled to characterize certain behaviors as anti-Semitic because they know that is the one sin campus will surely condemn.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.