Direct Funding, Not Tax Credits, Is the Best Way for the Government to Support Private Education

June 10 2025

Let’s now turn from the Israeli Supreme Court to the American one, which, due to the recusal of Amy Coney Barrett, issued a decision on May 22 to uphold a ruling by an Oklahoma court blocking the establishment of a Catholic charter school. But there are other legally viable means to allow governments to support religious schools. The most popular are vouchers or tax credits for those who send their children to non-public schools, whether religious or secular. Michael Broyde discusses their inadequacy:

If the goal is to empower families, then states should stop hiding behind convoluted tax structures and fund school choice the way we fund any private program that provides a public good. . . . And now that constitutional barriers to direct funding have largely been removed, there is no excuse to cling to these outdated mechanisms. If we want to fund these schools, we should do so with direct public funding of both private secular and parochial schools per student enrolled.

Tax-credit systems are regressive. Because they rely on donors receiving dollar-for-dollar reductions in their tax liability, they disproportionately benefit wealthier individuals—those with sufficient tax burdens to make large donations.

Poorer families, who can’t afford private tuition or large upfront costs, find themselves excluded. Meanwhile, the state loses revenue—sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars—that could have been directed more equitably through traditional public education or properly designed voucher systems for private and religious schools to those who need such aid. Moreover, tax-credit programs are structurally opaque.

Read more at Bloomberg

More about: Education, Freedom of Religion, Supreme Court

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict