The Right Way to Sanction the Muslim Brotherhood

June 13 2025

While the Iranian regime’s ideology is Shiite, its founders were inspired by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. The original Islamist group, the Brotherhood is the root from which Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Islamic State sprang; its motto declares that “jihad is our way and dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope” and anti-Semitism is a cornerstone of its ideology. At the same time, it is not a single organization, but consists of disparate groups in countries across the globe—some actively engaged in terrorism, others dedicated to spreading their hateful ideology peacefully. This reality is a complication for the Trump administration, which is considering sanctions on the Brotherhood.

Jonathan Schanzer explains that rather than simply issue an executive order that the next administration could appeal, the White House should instruct the Treasury Department to level anti-terrorism sanctions against specific branches of the Brotherhood as the evidence dictates:

The Brotherhood in Yemen (the Islah Party, which partners with the Houthis) and Jordan (where a violent Brotherhood plot was recently broken up by the government) are very likely to meet [Treasury Department] criteria. From there, the Treasury could begin to expand the network to other affiliates that meet [these] criteria.

The Treasury Department’s process offers the opportunity, over time, to designate the entire Muslim Brotherhood. When evidence points to certain branches or individuals from the Brotherhood’s disparate branches providing financial, technical, or material support to groups already under sanctions, they themselves become targets for designation.

Read more at Jerusalem Strategic Tribune

More about: Economic sanctions, Muslim Brotherhood, Terrorism, U.S. Foreign policy

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict