How are Iranians responding to the current military campaign? Is there really a possibility that they will rise up and overthrow the regime? Aidin Panahi writes:

Iran’s fate ultimately rests with a silent majority, what Iranians call the “gray zone” population. These are ordinary citizens: teachers, shopkeepers, bureaucrats, mid-level civil servants, and even some within the security apparatus who neither publicly oppose nor enthusiastically support the regime. Their silence reflects self-preservation, not loyalty. Every modern revolution has hinged upon similar groups. When these individuals sense regime collapse is imminent, their withdrawal of passive support becomes decisive.

Inside Iran, reactions to Israel’s military actions are complex but revealing. While state media decry Israeli aggression, privately many Iranians express relief or even cautious approval. Social-media commentary from within the country shows that ordinary Iranians see Israel’s actions not as attacks against the nation but against the oppressive structures of the regime. These nuanced views, carefully voiced in encrypted chats and indirect online comments, indicate a growing gap between regime narratives and public sentiment.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.