President Trump announced last night that a cease-fire in Gaza is imminent. If such an arrangement leaves Hamas in power, there will be serious dangers to Israel—although these are risks many Israelis are willing to take if the hostages are freed. But the dangers might be even greater for the people of Gaza. Moumen al-Natour explains:

I know there will be no leniency if the cease-fire takes effect. Hamas’s crackdown on dissent is intensifying. Over a dozen people have been killed in recent weeks—one of them a dear friend. Others have had their limbs broken in brutal acts of intimidation. As soon as the cease-fire is announced, Hamas militants will rise from their tunnels, hungry for revenge. Hit lists are already circulating on Telegram.

This is not a cry for pity—it is a warning. If Hamas is allowed to keep paying its fighters and civil servants in Gaza from the comfort of Doha, then the countdown to another October 7 has already begun. The only way truly to defeat Hamas is to build a civil alternative.

This is the greatest threat Hamas faces today. That is why the idea of a Hamas-free enclave must be central to any credible peace agreement. Such an enclave could be run by local civilians, protected internally by Gazan forces, and externally by neutral parties. Why not launch a pilot zone within the Gaza Strip, and expand it gradually? If it earns legitimacy and credibility, it can grow into a viable administration composed of technocrats and experts—ready to rebuild civil life and serve ordinary Gazans.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.