The Talmud, writes Simon Holloway, is replete with jokes and wordplay, and mentions rabbis using humor to maintain their students’ attention. But the rabbis were also wary of excessive mirth:

A famous maxim has it that one of the ways in which the Torah is acquired is through a reduction of merriment, and Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai rules that one is forbidden to fill one’s mouth with laughter in this world. . . .

An aversion to mockery may have underlined the reason behind a prohibition of theaters and circuses, and may have also been the reason behind Rabbi Zeira’s not laughing at Rabbi Yirmiyah’s terrible joke in Tractate Niddah—although it really is a terrible joke. Rabbi Akiva . . . once remarked that levity brings one to lewdness, and that references to “mirth” in the Torah are all references to idolatry. Since he himself employs humor as a pedagogical tool, it may be that he had in mind this distinction between mockery and other legitimate forms of making fun.

Indeed, the different motivations of those who attempt to make others laugh is important, with parodying scholars being universally condemned. Rabbi Yirmiyah, whose tasteless attempt at humor . . . was the subject of no small amount of controversy, . . . was even thrown out of the academy for one of his terrible jokes.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.