Moving Interfaith Dialogue Beyond Doctrine

Jan. 25 2016

December brought two significant developments in Jewish-Christian relations: a statement from the Vatican affirming the sacredness of Judaism in Catholic doctrine and a statement from an Orthodox Israeli organization describing Christianity as a component of the divine plan. Examining these statements, Peter Berger argues that dialogue between the faiths must not be limited to doctrinal questions, an especially important point for those who do not subscribe to a literalist interpretation of their scriptures:

Jews and Christians who cannot understand the Scriptures in . . . a literal way don’t really have the problem [of resolving] how the two covenants relate to each other—both are historically questionable. The question of whether they have a common faith must be addressed through a much more nuanced assessment of the core of each tradition, rather than through the quasi-juridical decision [as to] whether the same covenant covers both traditions. . . . I think that such an assessment will lead to the proposition that yes, Jews and Christians do have a shared faith in the same God.

The other questions, about common moral and political concerns, will also have to be addressed beyond the [strictly doctrinal issues]. These concerns have been strongly expressed in interfaith statements for many years since World War II—that anti-Semitism is a blasphemous offense against God and man; that any persecution of people because of their religion is morally unacceptable; that the state of Israel has a fundamental right to exist in safety. And recalling the Holocaust is a useful help in formulating every one of these concerns.

Read more at American Interest

More about: Anti-Semitism, Holocaust, Interfaith dialogue, Jewish-Christian relations, Religion & Holidays

Israel’s Syria Strategy in a Changing Middle East

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Donald Trump, Israeli Security, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy