In Not in God’s Name, Britain’s former chief rabbi rebuts the charge that religion is, in itself, an incurable source of brutal violence, seeks out the causes of religious violence, and suggests ways such violence—especially in the form of modern-day jihadism—can be checked. Michael Rosen writes in his review:

Sacks’s footing is firmest when he’s interpreting biblical texts and deriving ethical lessons from them; he paints the vivid characters populating Genesis with unrivaled poise, passion, and sensitivity. His language sparkles, too, when outlining the trajectory of Jewish history in its biblical and rabbinic eras, from its bellicose origins to its quietist present and equally so when exploring Christianity’s similar evolution.

Sacks is less persuasive, however, when explaining how that transformation can be replicated today, especially by Islam. For instance, in describing how the Jews sublimated their injunction to destroy the biblical nation of Amalek into a metaphor for pure evil, both internal and external, as a “struggle within the soul,” Sacks suggests how Islamists might reinterpret jihad. But are they listening? Should they be? . . . That the Jews have largely renounced violence hardly means Islamists will do the same.

If this book has a flaw, it’s this: it ought to appeal to all good-hearted religious people. However, the bad-hearted religious people don’t seem to be listening and the good-hearted secular folks don’t really need to. Sacks concludes by urging “an international campaign against the teaching and preaching of hate,” insisting on “reciprocal altruism” and recognizing that “we are all children of Abraham.” Will his call be enough to turn the tide of religious violence? Probably not. Must we heed it anyway? Absolutely.

Yasir Arafat was often quoted as saying that his “strongest weapon is the womb of an Arab woman.” That is, he believed the high birthrates of both Palestinians and Arab Israelis ensured that Jews would eventually be a minority in the Land of Israel, at which point Arabs could call for a binational state and get an Arab one. Using similar logic, both Israelis and their self-styled sympathizers have made the case for territorial concessions to prevent such an eventuality. Yet, Yoram Ettinger argues, the statistics have year after year told a different story:

Contrary to the projections of the demographic establishment at the end of the 19th century and during the 1940s, Israel’s Jewish fertility rate is higher than those of all Muslim countries other than Iraq and the sub-Saharan Muslim countries. Based on the latest data, the Jewish fertility rate of 3.13 births per woman is higher than the 2.85 Arab rate (since 2016) and the 3.01 Arab-Muslim fertility rate (since 2020).

The Westernization of Arab demography is a product of ongoing urbanization and modernization, with an increase in the number of women enrolling in higher education and increased use of contraceptives. Far from facing a “demographic time bomb” in Judea and Samaria, the Jewish state enjoys a robust demographic tailwind, aided by immigration.

However, the demographic and policy-making establishment persists in echoing official Palestinian figures without auditing them, ignoring a 100-percent artificial inflation of those population numbers. This inflation is accomplished via the inclusion of overseas residents, double-counting Jerusalem Arabs and Israeli Arabs married to Arabs living in Judea and Samaria, an inflated birth rate, and deflated death rate.

The U.S. should derive much satisfaction from Israel’s demographic viability and therefore, Israel’s enhanced posture of deterrence, which is America’s top force- and dollar-multiplier in the Middle East and beyond.