In the recent case of Ben-Levi v. Brown, a Jewish inmate sued a prison for denying him the right to hold a weekly Torah-study session with other Jewish prisoners. A federal court ruled in favor of the prison on grounds that fly in the face of a long-accepted principle: namely, in the Supreme Court’s formulation, that “the federal courts have no business addressing” the question of whether a person has properly understood his own religion’s doctrines. Mitchell Rocklin and Howard Slugh write:

The court, applying the test now advocated by the Obama administration [in a case, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, upcoming at the Supreme Court], made its own determination regarding the religious harm that Ben-Levi would suffer if denied the ability to study with other Jewish inmates. The court reached the absurd conclusion that it was actually protecting Ben-Levi’s religiosity by denying his request. According to the court, Ben-Levi had not suffered any harm because, in its view, Judaism prohibited individuals from studying together in the absence of ten men or a rabbi.

In other words, the court concluded that Ben-Levi did not deserve a religious exemption because he misunderstood his own religion. In doing so, the court acted as a religious tribunal rather than a secular court—and an incompetent one at that. No major denomination of Judaism prohibits the study in question. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Justice Alito wrote a dissent stating that he would have taken the case and reversed the decision. He criticized the lower courts for impermissibly holding that “a plaintiff’s own interpretation of his religion must yield to the government’s interpretation.”

This case offers a clear example of the danger inherent in courts’ second-guessing plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. The district court’s interpretation of Judaism has no basis in Jewish doctrine. . . . [But the] court’s specific misunderstanding—as baffling as it may be—is mostly beside the point. The court’s confusion highlights why judges should not be in the business of deciding theological questions. That might be the role of Saudi Arabian courts, but it is not the role of the American judiciary.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.