Drawing on ancient rabbinic interpretations as well as archaeological evidence, Marc Zvi Brettler suggests understanding the book of Esther (which will be read Saturday night and Sunday for the holiday of Purim) as a counterpoint to the story of Saul in the book of Samuel, beginning with the fact that its hero Mordecai (and, by extension, his cousin Esther) is, like Saul, a member of the tribe of Benjamin:

“In the fortress of Shushan lived a Jew by the name of Mordecai, son of Jair son of Shimei son of Kish, a Benjaminite.” [Thus the text introduces Mordecai]. . . . [A]s is often the case in genealogies, “son” here likely means “descendant,” and it appears that the Kish mentioned here is intended to refer to the very same Kish who is the father of the Benjaminite King Saul (1 Sam 9:1-2). . . . Targum Sheni, an expansive midrashic translation of Esther (written in the 8th or 9th century CE) makes this explicit by charting Mordecai’s lineage directly to Saul. . . .

As a result of his failure to fulfill precisely God’s command in the battle against Amalek, the kingship is taken away from Saul and given to David. . . . The story of Mordecai and his cousin Esther thus represents Saul’s successful second chance or comeback. As such, it contains many [implicit linguistic] references to the stories concerning Saul and his family found in Samuel. . . .

In Esther the evil protagonist is Haman, who five times is called “the Agagite,” [meaning] the descendant of Agag. This term, used only here in the entire Bible, refers to Agag, the Amalekite king whom King Saul spared rather than killing as he was commanded (1 Samuel 15:8-9). [Indeed, this act of disobedience led to God’s decision to reject Saul.]

In Esther, by contrast, Saul’s descendants bring about the death of the vile descendant of Agag, king of Amalek. And Mordecai, unlike Saul, does not even need a divine command; . . . he knows to do so by himself. And while Saul had nothing to fear, Mordecai had much to fear: he endangers himself and Esther by pressuring her to speak with Ahasuerus.

Like his predecessor, Donald Trump seeks to expand the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia. But there are other Arab nations that might consider taking such a step. Ahmad Charai points to Kuwait—home to the Middle East’s largest U.S. army base and desperately in need of economic reform—as a good candidate. Kuwaitis haven’t forgiven Palestinians for supporting Saddam Hussein during his 1990 invasion, but their country has been more rhetorically hostile to Israel than its Gulf neighbors:

The Abraham Accords have reshaped Middle Eastern diplomacy. . . . Kuwait, however, remains hesitant due to internal political resistance. While full normalization may not be immediately feasible, the United States should encourage Kuwait to take gradual steps toward engagement, emphasizing how participation in regional cooperation does not equate to abandoning its historical positions.

Kuwait could use its influence to push for peace in the Middle East through diplomatic channels opened by engagement rather than isolation. The economic benefits of joining the broader framework of the Abraham Accords are overwhelming. Israel’s leadership in technology, agriculture, and water management presents valuable opportunities for Kuwait to enhance its infrastructure. Trade and investment flows would diversify the economy, providing new markets and business partnerships.

Kuwaiti youth, who are increasingly looking for opportunities beyond the public sector, could benefit from collaboration with advanced industries, fostering job creation and entrepreneurial growth. The UAE and Bahrain have already demonstrated how normalization with Israel can drive economic expansion while maintaining their respective geopolitical identities.