In a decision that made for eye-catching headlines, a federal court upheld the conviction of a group of Orthodox Jews—including some rabbis—who, for a fee, would kidnap and torture recalcitrant husbands to force them to give a get, or halakhic bill of divorce, to wives they had abandoned. The defendants claimed that their activities were in fulfillment of a religious requirement and were thus protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Unsurprisingly, this argument failed to convince. But the court cited two reasons for its decision where, Michael A. Helfand argues, one would have been more than sufficient:

The first reason advanced by the federal court of appeals was that the burden on the defendants’ religious exercise wasn’t “substantial” and therefore RFRA, which only protects against substantial burdens, didn’t apply. . . . [W]hen you scratch below the surface, you begin to realize there are some serious problems lurking [behind this line of reasoning]. Can courts really figure out whether individuals, in pursuit of religious obligations, have other theologically sanctioned alternatives? . . .

When courts try to determine who is entitled to a religious-liberty exception to the law on the basis of theological substantiality—for example, by trying to parse the religious alternatives available under religious law—they invariably make mistakes. And those mistakes end up receiving the imprimatur of the law, both embarrassing the law and unjustifiably burdening someone’s faith. . . .

So should the Get Torture Gang have won? Of course not. . . . [The court] emphasized . . . a second reason for rejecting the religious-liberty claim of the Get Torture Gang: “the government has a compelling interest in uniform application of laws about violent crimes and that no other effective means of such uniformity existed.”

This second justification is as elegant as it is simple. Courts must decide when society’s interests are too important to allow for religious exceptions. No matter how strongly you feel about religious liberty, society can’t function if religious justifications can allow for the kidnapping and torture of others. In the end, religious liberty is only possible if it has limits that protect other fundamental interests of the public.

The court, in rejecting the claims of the Get Torture Gang, would have been best served by focusing on this second reason. It would have put the court in the position of rejecting an extreme religious-liberty claim based upon an assessment well within its expertise: namely, what should count as an important government interest. That’s a far better place for a court to be than . . . attempting to traverse the treacherous waters of theology.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.