The traditional liturgy for today—the fast day of Tisha b’Av, which commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples—includes a brief but central prayer describing Jerusalem as “laid waste of its dwellings, robbed of its glory, and desolate without inhabitants.” Since 1967, even some Orthodox Jews have advocated revising this text to accord better with today’s very different reality, although the majority have resisted change. Yet, argues Chaim Saiman, the observance of this day has changed radically, even in ultra-Orthodox circles, as evidenced, during the long interval between morning and late-afternoon/early-evening prayers, by the widespread practice of gathering in synagogue for lectures on the day’s themes or (for those in Israel) at the Western Wall to sing liturgical melodies.

Classically understood, Tisha b’Av . . . was not a time to feel close to God through Torah study, prayer, or thoughts of repentance as on the other fast days. Rather the focus . . . was on mourning, [enhanced by customs that produced] a disengagement from life and society and from any sense of routine. . . .

[T]he most dramatic shift in the tenor of Tisha b’Av has taken place in Israel, particularly at . . . what was once called the Wailing Wall. As the columnist known as Philologos notes, Western writers, Arabs, and Jews of the modern era all referred to the spot as the “Wailing Place” and then the “Wailing Wall,” following the Arabic appellation. Travelogues written in the 1870s indicate that wailing was the site’s primary activity—and not just on Tisha b’Av. Since 1967 however, Jews refer to it almost exclusively by the older, but less morose “Western Wall.”

In the past generation or two, the Wall has transformed from the focal point of Jewish wailing to the locus of Jewish pride, strength, and national resolve. The Wailing Wall is indeed no more. . . .

The afternoon videos and lectures and gatherings at the Wall [on Tisha b’Av] are all in tension with the spirit, if not the letter, of what until quite recently were accepted halakhic norms. [They] aim to create a more relevant and spiritually “productive” day, [drawing] on the modern preference for more affirming and engaging religious experiences. . . . Thus, the day that classical halakhah portrays as forlorn and empty, devoid of community, Torah, and song, is now commemorated—we might even say celebrated—through Torah study, community building, and [even] song.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.