Comedy, much of it subtle, is frequently employed by both the Jewish and Christian Bibles, argues Robin Gallaher Branch. She describes one of her first awakenings to biblical humor:

I remember one day resolving to do arduous work on 2Chronicles. Studiously plowing through the reigns of Solomon through Jehoshaphat, I came to 2Chronicles 21:20. . . . The text reads, “Jehoram was thirty-two years old when he became king, and he reigned in Jerusalem eight years. He passed away, to no one’s regret, and was buried in the City of David, but not in the tombs of the kings” (emphasis added). . . . Evidently Jehoram was not well liked. The editorial statement provides a light touch . . . to the Chronicler’s usually routine kingship formula. . . .

What’s more, argues Branch, the Bible seems to have something of a theology of humor:

Let’s start with [the most important] verse, Ecclesiastes 3:4: “A time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to mourn and a time to dance.” . . . [Next] let’s look at God’s laughter, for instance, in Psalms 37:12-13: “The wicked plot against the righteous, and gnash their teeth at them; but the Lord laughs at the wicked, for He sees that their day is coming.” Laughter here shows the impotence of the wicked and the futility of their plots and gnashings against the righteous. Why? Because, as the psalm answers, those who hope in the Lord will inherit the land and the Lord knows the wicked face a reckoning.

God directs the same kind of laughter toward earthly hotshots who think their power exceeds His. Psalm 2:2-4 declares that when “the kings of the earth take their stand,” marshalling themselves “against the Lord . . . and against His anointed one,” then “the One enthroned in heaven laughs.”

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.