In January 1957, Israel’s second war with Egypt had just ended, and Israeli forces still occupied much of the Sinai Peninsula—soon to be withdrawn under U.S. pressure. The American Jewish sage Joseph B. Soloveitchik had these events in mind when he delivered a sermon on the week’s Torah reading, which describes the splitting of the Sea of Reeds. Basil Herring has transcribed and translated the sermon:

When He was about to split the Sea of Reeds, God tells Moses (Exodus 14:4, 18) that [through the miracles He is about to perform] the Egyptians will come to “know” Him. Earlier, during the Ten Plagues, God had similarly said (Exodus 10:1-2) that the plagues were to teach future generations of Israelites to “know” God. And so the question arises as to why God found it necessary to repeat the same lesson at the Sea, and to once again explain His intent that He be “known.” More generally, we need to understand why God needs such recognition, such publicity, generation after generation. . . .

[There are] two types of bad actors who need different forms of punishment or correction. The first kind of evildoer does not pretend to justify his actions. He openly declares his intentions, no matter how nefarious they might be.

Take for instance Hitler. He never hid what he wanted to do to the Jews. The Nuremberg Laws were explicit in their racism and anti-Jewish prejudice. In this he was like the people of Sodom, who also openly enshrined their depravity in law. He, like they, had no shame. This type of evil is bad—but it is not as dangerous as the second type we will describe. For when evil is open and undisguised, and people can recognize it as such, it can and will mostly be opposed and combatted. But there is a different type of evildoer—one who projects a false mantle of righteousness, and thereby lulls his victims into a complacency that prevents them from opposing or fighting him until much later, when doing so is much more difficult. . . .

[After the Ten Plagues were over and Pharaoh had liberated the Israelites], a change occurred. . . . For [Pharaoh] now had an opportunity to play the righteous victim of what he claimed was Israelite perfidy. “After all,” he said, “the Israelites promised that they would return after three days in the desert, but now we see that they have no intention of coming back.” Furthermore he argued, “when they left they stole our gold, silver, and clothing, to which they had no right; am I not justified in pursuing them to restore our slaves and possessions to their rightful owners?”

Pharaoh was acting just as Egypt’s President Nasser does today when he says he will argue in the International Court at the Hague that, because he is in a state of war with Israel, he has every right to prevent Israel from free passage through the Suez Canal. Nasser in defeat, like Pharaoh at the Sea [is] claiming victimhood and self-defense.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.