A generation or two ago, writes Moshe Koppel, the denominational divisions among American Jews—between Conservative and Modern Orthodox, for example, or Modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, did not cut so deeply as they do now. Yet that has changed as the non-Orthodox denominations have gone into decline and Orthodox institutions have proliferated; today, adherents can spend their lives in the confines of their particular ideological sub-group. In Israel, by contrast, the opposite has happened, as once-ironclad divisions among the secular, religious Zionist, and ultra-Orthodox have begun to break down:

[Secular and religious Zionist youths] meet in the army and at work and they speak to each other with typical Israeli candidness, free of both rancor and the kind of reserve that typically stems from distance or mistrust. Increasingly, [ultra-Orthodox] kids are participating in these conversations as well; as soon as a technical solution is found to the problem of ḥaredi enlistment [in the military], the gap between them and the others will close very quickly.

In short, the boxes are breaking down in Israel. This has two salient consequences, each of which is only now beginning to become apparent. The first is that the question “are you ḥiloni [secular] or dati [religious] or ḥaredi [ultra-Orthodox]?” is, for many people, becoming hard to answer. Increasingly, degrees of Jewish observance in Israel lie on a spectrum, not in the familiar boxes, slowly converging to a normal distribution over the range, with a peak somewhere in the center that drops off slowly and symmetrically. (One consequence of this is long tails on each end populated by loud and strident outliers, giving the false impression that extremists are getting stronger.)

The second consequence is that the usual bundlings of ideologies, religious practices, and outward signals are unraveling. [Israelis] became accustomed to the idea that if they knew how someone dressed or how he acted in a given situation or where he went to yeshiva, they could pretty much guess all the rest. Forget that. The flourishing of a Jewish state and the confidence it has brought are leading to a new and surprising realignment.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.