Among Israel’s Ḥaredim, the basic bourgeois virtues of moderation, hard work, patriotism, and temperate consumption are largely lacking, notes Yehoshua Pfeffer. The constant pressure to strive for religious excellence, the emphasis on Torah study over work and the consequent widespread poverty, the suspicion of government, and the tendency toward asceticism especially among non-ḥasidic Ḥaredim, all militate against the creation of a ḥaredi middle class. Yet changes in ḥaredi society as greater numbers gain more exposure to the outside world, together with a growing minority of men working regular jobs and serving in the military, make the emergence of an ultra-Orthodox bourgeoisie a possibility. Pfeffer argues that such a development is both desirable and feasible, and would be aided by the deep-felt ḥaredi attachment to such traditional middle-class values as duty, voluntarism, and family loyalty.

Many thousands of ḥaredi men and women have already been making their way into Israeli academia, the general workforce, and public service. Even in terms of culture and leisure, large swaths of ḥaredi society have over recent years moved closer to general society, as evidenced both by the development of a ḥaredi culture [complete with its own popular music, newspapers, and so forth] and by increasing ḥaredi consumption of general culture (the popular Shtisel television series, depicting a ḥaredi family residing in Jerusalem, is a good example). Growing numbers of ḥaredi Facebook groups and a significant presence on other social-media platforms also indicate an unprecedented level of openness and integration. . . .

But even within the most conservative segments of ḥaredi society, . . . the growing embourgeoisement is unmistakable. Car ownership, [for instance], has risen sharply (up to 41 percent, based on latest surveys), and many allow themselves to enjoy an occasional meal at a restaurant and even family vacations abroad. . . .

The “heroic bourgeoisie” famously praised by Alexis de Tocqueville exhibits a combination of private initiative with virtue. [And] anyone who knows ḥaredi society cannot fail to be impressed by the degree of private initiative within it. This initiative can be seen in innumerable institutions [engaging in] charitable work, the provision of healthcare, evangelization to non-Orthodox Jews, religious education, and so forth. Some of these, like the United Hatzalah emergency medical service and the ZAKA disaster-response service, have enjoyed broad public resonance in serving the entire Israeli population. [Indeed], almost every second ḥaredi adult is involved in some sort of volunteer activity. If Tocqueville was amazed at the voluntary activities of the churches in America, he would likely have been no less impressed by the activity surrounding the synagogues in ḥaredi society.

[Furthermore], the ideas of Israeli Ḥaredim about economics are surprisingly similar to those of early Americans. A 2015 poll . . . revealed that among voters of various political parties, Ḥaredim are by far the most likely to endorse free-market positions.

While I’ve seen much speculation—some reasonable and well informed, some quite the opposite—about why Jerusalem chose Friday morning to begin its campaign against Iran, the most obvious explanation seems to be the most convincing. First, 60 days had passed since President Trump warned that Tehran had 60 days to reach an agreement with the U.S. over its nuclear program. Second, Israeli intelligence was convinced that Iran was too close to developing nuclear weapons to delay military action any longer. Edward Luttwak explains why Israel was wise to attack:

Iran was adding more and more centrifuges in increasingly vast facilities at enormous expense, which made no sense at all if the aim was to generate energy. . . . It might be hoped that Israel’s own nuclear weapons could deter an Iranian nuclear attack against its own territory. But a nuclear Iran would dominate the entire Middle East, including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, with which Israel has full diplomatic relations, as well as Saudi Arabia with which Israel hopes to have full relations in the near future.

Luttwak also considers the military feats the IDF and Mossad have accomplished in the past few days:

To reach all [its] targets, Israel had to deal with the range-payload problem that its air force first overcame in 1967, when it destroyed the air forces of three Arab states in a single day. . . . This time, too, impossible solutions were found for the range problem, including the use of 65-year-old airliners converted into tankers (Boeing is years later in delivering its own). To be able to use its short-range F-16s, Israel developed the “Rampage” air-launched missile, which flies upward on a ballistic trajectory, gaining range by gliding down to the target. That should make accuracy impossible—but once again, Israeli developers overcame the odds.