Among Israel’s Ḥaredim, the basic bourgeois virtues of moderation, hard work, patriotism, and temperate consumption are largely lacking, notes Yehoshua Pfeffer. The constant pressure to strive for religious excellence, the emphasis on Torah study over work and the consequent widespread poverty, the suspicion of government, and the tendency toward asceticism especially among non-ḥasidic Ḥaredim, all militate against the creation of a ḥaredi middle class. Yet changes in ḥaredi society as greater numbers gain more exposure to the outside world, together with a growing minority of men working regular jobs and serving in the military, make the emergence of an ultra-Orthodox bourgeoisie a possibility. Pfeffer argues that such a development is both desirable and feasible, and would be aided by the deep-felt ḥaredi attachment to such traditional middle-class values as duty, voluntarism, and family loyalty.

Many thousands of ḥaredi men and women have already been making their way into Israeli academia, the general workforce, and public service. Even in terms of culture and leisure, large swaths of ḥaredi society have over recent years moved closer to general society, as evidenced both by the development of a ḥaredi culture [complete with its own popular music, newspapers, and so forth] and by increasing ḥaredi consumption of general culture (the popular Shtisel television series, depicting a ḥaredi family residing in Jerusalem, is a good example). Growing numbers of ḥaredi Facebook groups and a significant presence on other social-media platforms also indicate an unprecedented level of openness and integration. . . .

But even within the most conservative segments of ḥaredi society, . . . the growing embourgeoisement is unmistakable. Car ownership, [for instance], has risen sharply (up to 41 percent, based on latest surveys), and many allow themselves to enjoy an occasional meal at a restaurant and even family vacations abroad. . . .

The “heroic bourgeoisie” famously praised by Alexis de Tocqueville exhibits a combination of private initiative with virtue. [And] anyone who knows ḥaredi society cannot fail to be impressed by the degree of private initiative within it. This initiative can be seen in innumerable institutions [engaging in] charitable work, the provision of healthcare, evangelization to non-Orthodox Jews, religious education, and so forth. Some of these, like the United Hatzalah emergency medical service and the ZAKA disaster-response service, have enjoyed broad public resonance in serving the entire Israeli population. [Indeed], almost every second ḥaredi adult is involved in some sort of volunteer activity. If Tocqueville was amazed at the voluntary activities of the churches in America, he would likely have been no less impressed by the activity surrounding the synagogues in ḥaredi society.

[Furthermore], the ideas of Israeli Ḥaredim about economics are surprisingly similar to those of early Americans. A 2015 poll . . . revealed that among voters of various political parties, Ḥaredim are by far the most likely to endorse free-market positions.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.