The Ancient Greeks and Romans, but Not the Jews, Believed in Mythical Creatures

Oct. 16 2019

In his 2012 book Why I Became an Atheist, the former theology student John Loftus lists among his many criticisms of the Hebrew Bible its belief in the existence of such fanciful creatures as satyrs and unicorns. Dave Armstrong points out the shallowness of this argument:

Unfortunately, the word “unicorn” appears in the King James Version (note that translations are not the Bible itself, and not infallible) nine times. But even the secular editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica wrote that “certain poetical passages of the biblical Old Testament refer to a strong and splendid horned animal called r’em. This word was translated ‘unicorn’ or ‘rhinoceros’ in many versions of the Bible, but many modern translations prefer ‘wild ox’ (aurochs), which is the correct meaning.”

The Hebrew word sa’ir appears about 52 times in the Old Testament, . . . and is used, for example, to speak of the male goat used as a sin offering on the Day of Atonement. For some reason the 1611 King James Version rendered sa’ir as “satyr” twice (Isaiah 13:21; 34:14). The surrounding contexts, however, prove that it is again referring to wild goats. Isaiah 13:21-22 makes reference to wild beasts, howling creatures, hyenas, and jackals (all real animals, last time I checked). Goats fit right in with this “zoo.”

Meanwhile, the Roman natural philosopher Pliny the Elder (23–79 CE) literally believed in legendary creatures such as the manticore, basilisk, catoblepas, phoenix, and werewolf. Herodotus, Ovid, and Virgil wrote seriously about werewolves. [But] the ancient Hebrews (unlike the “sophisticated” pagan Greeks and Romans) did not believe in mythical animals.

Read more at National Catholic Register

More about: ancient Judaism, Hebrew Bible, New Atheists

Fake International Law Prolongs Gaza’s Suffering

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Gaza War 2023, International Law