In his 2012 book Why I Became an Atheist, the former theology student John Loftus lists among his many criticisms of the Hebrew Bible its belief in the existence of such fanciful creatures as satyrs and unicorns. Dave Armstrong points out the shallowness of this argument:

Unfortunately, the word “unicorn” appears in the King James Version (note that translations are not the Bible itself, and not infallible) nine times. But even the secular editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica wrote that “certain poetical passages of the biblical Old Testament refer to a strong and splendid horned animal called r’em. This word was translated ‘unicorn’ or ‘rhinoceros’ in many versions of the Bible, but many modern translations prefer ‘wild ox’ (aurochs), which is the correct meaning.”

The Hebrew word sa’ir appears about 52 times in the Old Testament, . . . and is used, for example, to speak of the male goat used as a sin offering on the Day of Atonement. For some reason the 1611 King James Version rendered sa’ir as “satyr” twice (Isaiah 13:21; 34:14). The surrounding contexts, however, prove that it is again referring to wild goats. Isaiah 13:21-22 makes reference to wild beasts, howling creatures, hyenas, and jackals (all real animals, last time I checked). Goats fit right in with this “zoo.”

Meanwhile, the Roman natural philosopher Pliny the Elder (23–79 CE) literally believed in legendary creatures such as the manticore, basilisk, catoblepas, phoenix, and werewolf. Herodotus, Ovid, and Virgil wrote seriously about werewolves. [But] the ancient Hebrews (unlike the “sophisticated” pagan Greeks and Romans) did not believe in mythical animals.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.