Understanding the Rabbinic Debate over Imitation Pork Products

Last fall, the Orthodox Union (OU)—the world’s largest kosher-supervision agency—declined to approve a soy product titled “Impossible Pork,” in part because many Orthodox Jews objected to the word “pork” in the name. As Shlomo Brody notes, however, the OU’s director “kept the door open for revisiting the decision.”

Interestingly, many kashrut agencies have provided certification for vegan or plant-based burgers, nondairy margarine, and even fake shrimp. The OU itself certifies “porkless plant-based snack rinds” as well as Bacos, one of the first soy-based meat substitutes. In theory, some of these products could be problematic if people were to confuse the substitutes with the original prohibited item.

This problem, known in halakhic literature as mar’it ayin [i.e., the appearance or impropriety], can be circumvented if there are clear markers [distinguishing the permitted object or activity from the forbidden], or if it becomes readily known that there are fake look-alike versions.

Thus medieval authorities found ways to permit drinking almond milk with meat products, much as we allow nondairy creamer at meat meals. Besides printing clear kosher symbols on product labels, some kosher supervision agencies will insist that the product name should indicate that this is a faux version (e.g., “veggie bacon”), something that the makers of “Impossible Pork” were apparently unwilling to do.

Read more at Jerusalem Post

More about: Halakhah, Kashrut, Pork

 

Israel Just Sent Iran a Clear Message

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Iran, Israeli Security