The grandson of the famed French Bible and Talmud commentator Solomon ben Isaac (better known as Rashi), Samuel ben Meir (ca. 1080–1174) was himself the author of commentaries on these texts, not all of which have survived. In his introduction to his glosses to the Pentateuch, Rashbam (as Samuel is called in rabbinic literature) portrayed himself as carrying on his grandfather’s legacy by analyzing the plain sense of the text, without reference to traditional rabbinic exegesis, or midrash. Tamar Marvin takes stock of his life and work:

It’s been argued that living in the shadow of Rashi—not to mention that of his less-prickly, overachiever younger brother Rabbi Jacob ben Meir Tam—laid upon Rashbam a burdensome anxiety of influence: that it’s this that impelled him toward staking a claim of his own, or what we moderns would term originality. It couldn’t have been otherwise, but I don’t see Rashbam’s personality as dominated by his grandfather’s legacy; he’s nothing if not self-possessed. And had good reason to be. . . . Rashbam felt himself, rightly, at the very center of Ashkenazi high culture, his piety unimpeachable, his yiḥus (lineage) sterling, his hall of study bustling.

Rashbam lived his whole life in the dusty Champagne town of Ramerupt. He was apparently there, as recent research indicates, because of exclusive rights granted to his brother by local officials. This meant that Rashbam had a potential vector of close interaction with local Christians, which is evidenced in his writings. Some scholars have argued that this is how Rashbam caught wind of the so-called 12th-century renaissance, the outburst of knowledge production centered in the burgeoning church schools of Paris. Others have emphasized that it gave Rashbam familiarity with Christian readings of the Bible, which he answered explicitly with anti-Christological readings of his own.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.