Much of the Talmud, such important prayers as kaddish, and various other sacred Jewish texts are written in Aramaic, once the lingua franca of much of the Middle East. Another dialect of the language is used in the Syrian Christian liturgy. Neither rabbis nor Syrian priests have much opportunity to use the tongue in conversation—but, as Jonathan Sacerdoti notes, there are exceptions. The coronation of Charles III was one:

Britain’s Sephardi leader Rabbi Joseph Dweck has revealed he chatted to the archbishop of the Syrian Orthodox Church in Aramaic—the language spoken by Jesus—as they were waiting for the coronation to begin. Rabbi Dweck, who sat next to the archbishop during the service, added that the Christian leader was “asking me more about Orthodox Judaism, which was interesting.”

The senior rabbi of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews’ Congregation, Britain’s oldest Jewish community, described the mood there as “buoyant and joyful.” . . . Rabbi Dweck was seated with other faith leaders in the North Transept [of Westminster Abbey]. “And I was sitting in front of [the former archbishop of Canterbury], Rowan Williams, so we spoke about him studying Biblical Hebrew.”

Rabbi Dweck said: “The anointing itself comes directly from the Bible, from Torah. The archbishop blessed the king with the birkat kohanim (the priestly blessing) after he crowned him.”

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.