Louisiana recently enacted a law requiring that the text of the Ten Commandments be displayed in every public-school classroom. Almost immediately afterwards, the ACLU filed a lawsuit complaining that the regulation violated the First Amendment. Once, the ACLU would have had a near-airtight case, but a 2022 Supreme Court ruling has changed the way the First Amendment is applied in such instances, and this lawsuit will test the new doctrine. Michael A. Helfand explains that there are two reasons the law might still fail to pass muster:

First, in its most recent decisions, the current Supreme Court has been clear that government still cannot enact laws that are religiously coercive. . . . And at least in the past, the Supreme Court has construed the concept of religious coercion broadly, to . . . encompass laws that don’t quite force others to participate in a religious practice. For example, in 1992, the Supreme Court held that a religious prayer at a public-school graduation—technically a program where attendance is voluntary—violated principles of church-state separation because it constituted a form of “subtle pressure” on students to attend and participate.

Second, the court has also previously held that “denominational preference”—that is, enacting laws that prefer one religion over others—also violates the First Amendment. . . . Louisiana’s law explicitly chooses a version of the Ten Commandments that differs in text and emphasis from the version embraced by various Jewish and Christian denominations. Moreover, the very idea of privileging the Ten Commandments in the classroom might constitute a preference for the Judeo-Christian tradition over and above the traditions of other faith communities.

In a sense, the most successful negotiation with Hamas was the recent agreement securing the release of Edan Alexander, the last living hostage with a U.S. passport. Unlike those previously handed over, he wasn’t exchanged for Palestinian prisoners, and there was no cease-fire. Dan Diker explains what Hamas got out of the deal:

Alexander’s unconditional release [was] designed to legitimize Hamas further as a viable negotiator and to keep Hamas in power, particularly at a moment when Israel is expanding its military campaign to conquer Gaza and eliminate Hamas as a military, political, and civil power. Israel has no other option than defeating Hamas. Hamas’s “humanitarian” move encourages American pressure on Israel to end its counterterrorism war in service of advancing additional U.S. efforts to release hostages over time, legitimizing Hamas while it rearms, resupplies, and reestablishes it military power and control.

In fact, Hamas-affiliated media have claimed credit for successful negotiations with the U.S., branding the release of Edan Alexander as the “Edan deal,” portraying Hamas as a rising international player, sidelining Israel from direct talks with DC, and declaring this a “new phase in the conflict.”

Fortunately, however, Washington has not coerced Jerusalem into ceasing the war since Alexander’s return. Nor, Diker observes, did the deal drive a wedge between the two allies, despite much speculation about the possibility.