To Attract Followers, Religion Has to Offer Something Not Found Elsewhere

Having recently attended services at two churches, one belonging to the Episcopal Church, long one of the most important American denominations, and the other to a “more conservative” offshoot, Stephen Cranney writes:

At the former, known for its grand architecture and progressive stance on contemporary social issues, the congregation was dignified yet notably older. At the second location, a congregation buzzed with energy. Young families filled the pews, cutting-edge media accompanied a crisp, not missing-a-beat homily from a relatively young preacher.

The statistics, Cranney notes, back up his observation: attendance at mainstream Episcopalian churches has dropped dramatically over the past ten years, while the conservative offshoot, the Anglican Church of North America, has grown steadily. And the same is true for other denominations as well:

If liberalization and changing doctrines to align more closely with faddish social sentiment make a religion more popular, we would expect to see these trends reversed. . . . While almost all faiths are struggling in the increasingly secular 21st century, it seems clear that the “liberal” faiths are struggling more than others. The reasons why are complex, and it is impossible fully to address the debate here, but . . . it is likely that churches that exhibit some tension with the background environment, that are distinctive enough for people to see something different in them, are the ones that thrive.

Read more at Deseret News

More about: American Religion, Decline of religion

The U.S. Has Finally Turned Up the Heat on the Houthis—but Will It Be Enough?

March 17 2025

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Donald Trump, Houthis, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen