By the 1950s, even the most Orthodox of Jews had accepted that girls should receive formal education in religious texts. At the same time, most Orthodox schools, whether modern or haredi, provided girls with instruction in the Hebrew Bible and practical ritual law, but not in Talmud. The latter text and its associated works, known collectively as the “oral Torah” as they were based on what were once word-of-mouth traditions, were exclusively the preserve of men. In 1953, Rabbi Leonard Rosenfeld, on behalf of a school called the Hebrew Institute of Long Island (HILI), asked Joseph B. Soloveitchik, then one of America’s greatest rabbis, for his view on teaching the Talmud to women. Joseph C. Kaplan, who knew Rosenfeld personally, writes:

Four months later, in a letter dated May 27, 1953—the letter that has sparked so much discussion and debate in the Modern Orthodox community and beyond—the Rav, [as Soloveitchik was affectionately known], answered Rosenfeld: “As to your question with regard to a curriculum in a coeducational school, I expressed my opinion to you long ago that it would be a very regrettable oversight on our part if we were to arrange separate Hebrew courses for girls. Not only is the teaching of oral Torah to girls permissible but it is nowadays an absolute imperative. This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject matter and method of instruction which is still advocated by certain groups within our Orthodox community has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.”

Five years ago, the letter was published and is now widely known. But, Kaplan notes, a mystery remains:

Why did HILI, after passing an official resolution giving a “binding commitment” that it “would be bound by [the Rav’s decision] in the matter,” never comply with its commitment?

Kaplan hazards a guess:

It is possible that what HILI had agreed to was to be bound by a traditional t’shuvah—legal ruling—that discusses the surrounding circumstances, sets forth an answer to all the questions being asked, issues a specific halakhic ruling, and, critically, details the halakhic sources upon which that ruling is based. The Rav’s terse May letter, however, was very different.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.