During the coronavirus pandemic, Uri Allen became the rabbi of suburban New Jersey synagogue that “was once a vibrant and shining example of post-war Conservative Judaism” but had become “just a shell of its former self.” Allen and his congregants realized not too long afterward that it would soon be time to shutter its doors, something that is likely to happen to many American houses of Jewish worship in the coming years. He describes the process, to which he gave careful thought, looking to traditional laws of burial and mourning for guidance. Particularly difficult was

finding good homes for almost 100 years of things that one finds in a synagogue. Siddurim and mahzorim [holiday prayer books] were donated, and congregants took home photographs, plaques, and other keepsake items. Some of the furniture was sold. The disposition of our Torah scrolls required more thought. [The congregation] was fortunate to have seven Torah scrolls, all of which found wonderful, new homes. Some went to new synagogues where our members had relatives. We sent one Torah each to emerging communities in Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Byron Bay, Australia; and Riverdale, New York.

Even as the Torahs left our possession, we were touched to know they would be part of Judaism lived elsewhere. Our members felt good about the fact that their sacred Torah scrolls would be used by Jewish communities all around the world. This gave the congregation an immense sense of purpose.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.