On a lighter Rosh Hashanah-related note, Tevi Troy confesses that he sometimes brings a book to synagogue to read during the slow points of the lengthy services, although, he insists, never during the rabbi’s sermon:

Our grandfather had gotten in trouble back in Poland for reading Daniel Deronda inside the flaps of his prayer book. This was a scandal, as his grandfather, my great-great-grandfather, was the synagogue rabbi and was irate at the discovery.

The reading-in-synagogue habit has many benefits: it helps me get to synagogue on time and with a spring in my step, knowing my time there will be filled with either active prayer or meaningful reading. It also helps me remember each year more clearly. High Holy Day services, in accordance with Jewish tradition, are exactly the same year in and year out. New books ensure holidays do not blend together in my memory. In addition, I find that, as on airplanes, having your face in a book discourages unwanted conversations, thus reducing the amount of talking in synagogue.

Troy recommends several books for this purpose, but let me also suggest, as an alternative, printing out one of our excellent past essays on Rosh Hashanah: Dov Lerner on the meaning of the shofar, Jack Wertheimer on changing trends in American Jewish High Holy Day observance, Philologos on Rosh Hashanah greeting cards, or Nathan Laufer on how Rosh Hashanah and Shavuot got terribly mixed up.

Two of the most important questions about the recent agreement with Hamas are “Why now?” and “What is the relationship between the deal and the military campaign?” To Ron Ben-Yishai, the answer to the two questions is related, and flies in the face of the widespread (and incorrect) claim that the same agreement could have been reached in May:

Contrary to certain public perceptions, the military pressure exerted on northern Gaza in recent months was the main leverage that led to flexibility on the part of Hamas and made clear to the terror group that it would do well to agree to a deal now, before thousands more of its fighters are killed, and before the IDF advances further and destroys Gaza entirely.

Andrew Fox, meanwhile, presents a more comprehensive strategic analysis of the cease-fire:

Tactically, Hamas has taken a severe beating in Gaza since October 2023. It is assessed that it has lost as much as 90 percent of military capability and 80 percent of manpower, although it has recruited well and boosted its numbers from below 10,000 to the 20–30,000 range. However, these are untrained recruits, often under-age, and the IDF has been striking their training camps in northern Gaza so they have been unable to form any kind of meaningful capability. This is not a fighting force that retains any ability to harm the IDF in real numbers, although, as seen this past week with a fatal IED attack, they are able to score the odd hit.

However, this has not affected Hamas’s ability to retain administrative control of Gaza.

Internationally, Hamas sits alone in glory on the information battlefield. It has won the most resounding victory imaginable in the world’s media, in Western states, and on the Internet. . . . The stock of the Palestinian cause rides high internationally and will only get higher as Hamas proclaims a victory following this cease-fire deal. By means of political pressure on Israel, the international information campaign has kept Hamas in the fight, extended the war, prolonged the suffering of Gazan civilians, and has ultimately handed Hamas a win through the fact of their continued survival and eventual rebuild.

Indeed, writes Fox in a separate post, the “images coming out of Gaza over the last few days show us that too many in the wider world have been played for fools.”

Hamas fighters have been seen emerging from hospitals and the humanitarian zone. Well-fed Palestinians, with fresh haircuts and Adidas tracksuits, or in just vests, cheer for the camera. . . . There was no starvation. There was no freezing. There was no genocide.