In Philadelphia 80 years ago, Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidim launched their campaign of public menorah lightings, which has popularized the distinctive straight-line shape of the candelabrum preferred by their late rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson. Reviel Netz examines the origin of this view of what a menorah should look like:

In a talk, or siḥah, delivered in 1982, Schneerson drew upon the great Yemenite-Israeli scholar Rabbi Joseph Kafih’s edition of Moses Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah, which reproduced Maimonides’ own hand-drawn sketch, or diagram, of the menorah as described by the Mishnah. As Kafih noted, this drawing was attested to in the best Yemenite manuscripts, as well as the famous autograph manuscript held in Oxford, and it contradicted the “fake” image [of a curved-branched menorah] on the Arch of Titus.

After a careful examination of Maimonides’ drawing in the context of medieval mathematical and scientific illustrations, Netz throws some doubt on Schneerson’s interpretation. He then offers a defense:

What Schneerson understood perfectly well was that pictures are never neutral and always depend on a visual code. Why do we have so many images of the round-branched menorahs? . . . There are other sources for the round-branched menorah as well but, ultimately, it all goes back to that Roman carving. This made Schneerson rightly suspicious. Indeed, the representation on the Arch of Titus is too elegant, and in a very Greco-Roman way. The curves of the menorah fit within the overall dynamic swerve of the procession depicted on the arch.

The Chabad menorah . . . cancels all ornamentation—those pleasing Jewish alternatives to Christmas tree decorations—and replaces them with an austere geometric form, breathing the scientific-philosophical purity of Maimonides. Geometrical plainness, perhaps, is the point. When we look at eight straight lines, we can imagine an abstract network of relations in space, where the very categories of “straight” or “curved” lose meaning.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.